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THE GAUSS-SEIDEL METHOD FOR GENERALIZED NASH
EQUILIBRIUM PROBLEMS OF POLYNOMIALS
JIAWANG NIE, XINDONG TANG, AND LINGLING XU
Abstract. This paper concerns the generalized Nash equilibrium problem of
polynomials (GNEPP). We apply the Gauss-Seidel method and Lasserre type
Moment-SOS relaxations to solve GNEPPs. The convergence of the Gauss-
Seidel method is known for some special GNEPPs, such as generalized poten-
tial games (GPGs). We give a sufficient condition for GPGs and propose a
numerical certificate, based on Putinar’s Positivstellensatz. Numerical exam-
ples for both convex and nonconvex GNEPPs are given for demonstrating the
efficiency of the proposed method.
1. Introduction
The generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP) is a kind of games such that
the feasible set of each player’s strategy depends on other players’ strategies. Let N
be the number of players. Suppose the ith player’s strategy is the variable xi ∈ Rni
(the ni-dimensional Euclidean space over the real field R). The vector of all players’
strategy is
x := (x1, . . . , xN ).
The total dimension of all players’ strategies is n := n1+ · · ·+nN . For convenience,
we use x−i to denote the subvector of all players’ strategies except the ith one, i.e.,
x−i := (x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xN ).
When the ith player’s strategy xi is considered, we use (xi, x−i) to represent x.
When (y, x−i) is written, it means that the ith player’s strategy is y ∈ Rni while
the vector of all other players’ strategies is fixed to be x−i. This paper considers
GNEPs whose objective and constraining functions are given by polynomials.
Definition 1.1. A generalized Nash equilibrium problem of polynomials (GNEPP)
is to find x ∈ Rn such that each xi is an optimizer of the ith player’s optimization
problem
(1.1)
{
min
xi∈R
ni
fi(xi, x−i)
s.t. gi,j(xi, x−i) ≥ 0 (j = 1, . . . , si),
where all fi(xi, x−i) and gi,j(xi, x−i) are polynomial functions in x. A solution x
satisfying the above is called a generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE).
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Let gi = (gi,1, . . . , gi,si) : R
n → Rsi be the vector-valued function. The inequality
gi(xi, x−i) ≥ 0 is defined componentwisely. Then (1.1) can be rewritten as
(1.2)
{
min
xi∈R
ni
fi(xi, x−i)
s.t. gi(xi, x−i) ≥ 0.
For given x−i, the feasible strategy set for the ith player is
(1.3) Xi(x−i) := {xi ∈ Rni : gi(xi, x−i) ≥ 0}.
The entire strategy vector x is said to be a feasible point if each subvector xi of x
is feasible for (1.2). For instance, the following GNEP with two players
(1.4)
min
x1∈R1
x1 min
x2∈R1
(x2)
2 − (x1 − 1)x2
s.t. x2(x1 − x2 − 1) ≥ 0, s.t. (x1)2 + (x2)2 ≤ 3,
x1 ≥ 0, x2 ≥ 0
is a GNEPP. The dimensions n1 = n2 = 1 and
X1(x−1) = {x1 ∈ R : x2(x1 − x2 − 1) ≥ 0, x1 ≥ 0},
X2(x−2) = {x2 ∈ R : (x1)2 + (x2)2 ≤ 3, x2 ≥ 0}.
For the first player, when x2 > 0, its feasible set is x1 ≥ x2+1, and its best strategy
is x1 = x2 + 1. When x2 = 0, the first player’s best strategy is x1 = 0. For any
fixed x1 with x
2
1 ≤ 3, the second player’s problem is feasible and its best strategy
is max((x1 − 1)/2, 0). One can verify that (0, 0) is a GNE for this GNEPP.
Generalized Nash equilibrium problems have broad applications, for instance,
in the environmental pollution control [8, 17]. Let N be the number of countries
involved in the pollution control and xi,0 denote the (gross) emissions from the
ith country. Assume that the by-product gross emissions are proportional to the
industrial output. The revenue of the ith country depends on xi,0. Typically, the
revenue is xi,0(bi− 1/2xi,0) with a given parameter bi. The variable xi,j represents
the investment from country i to country j. Let xi := (xi,0, . . . , xi,N ). For an
investor, the benefit of the investment lies in the emissions reduction units γi,jxi,j
with given parameters γi,j(i, j = 1, · · · , N). The net emission in country i is xi,0 −∑N
j=1 γj,ixj,i, which is always nonnegative. The accounted-for-emissions for the ith
country is xi,0 −
∑N
j=1 γi,jxi,j . It must be kept below or equal a certain prescribed
level Ei under the environmental control. The pollution in a country may affect
other countries. The pollution damage for the ith country is
pi := xi,0 −
N∑
j=1
γj,ixj,i + 2
N∏
k=1
(xk,0 −
N∑
j=1
γj,kxj,k).
For given parameters bi, γi,j , Ei, the ith country’s optimization problem is
(1.5)


min
xi
−xi,0(bi − 12xi,0) +
N∑
j=1
xi,j + pi
s.t. xi,0 . . . xi,j ≥ 0,
xi,0 −
∑N
j=1 γi,jxi,j ≤ Ei,
xk,0 −
∑N
j=1 γj,kxj,k ≥ 0 (k = 1, . . . , N).
All countries expect to maximize their revenues subtracting investments and pollu-
tion damages. Another application of GNEPP is the model for Internet switching
(see Example 5.8). More applications for GNEPPs can be found in [1,9,10,47,62].
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1.1 GNEPs and some existing work
The GNEP is an extension of the Nash equilibrium problem (NEP) [38,39]. For
NEPs, the feasible set of each player’s strategy is independent of other players. The
GNEP originated from economics and was studied in [3,7,11,34,52]. Robinson [49,
50] established the shadow prices for measuring the effectiveness in an optimization-
based combat model. Scotti [57] introduced GNEPs into the study of structural
design. Recently, GNEPs have been widely used in many different areas outside
economics, such as transportation, telecommunications, pollution control. We refer
to [2, 8, 45, 59, 63, 64] for related work.
The following is a classical result about existence of solutions for GNEPs [11,17].
We refer to [51] for the notion of outer and inner semicontinuity and quasi-convexity.
Theorem 1.2. [11,17] Suppose the GNEP of (1.1) satisfies:
(1) There exist N nonempty, convex and compact sets Ki ⊆ Rni such that
for every (xi, x−i) ∈ Rn with xi ∈ Ki and for every i, the set Xi(x−i) is
nonempty, closed and convex, Xi(x−i) ⊆ Ki, and Xi( · ), as a point-to-set
map, is both outer and inner semicontinuous.
(2) For every given x−i, the function fi( · , x−i) is quasi-convex on Xi(x−i).
Then, a generalized Nash equilibrium exists.
There are no special existence results for solutions of GNEPPs, to the best of
the authors’ knowledge. There exists some work for solving GNEPs. Under some
convexity assumptions, the GNEP is equivalent to a quasi-variational inequality
problem(QVIP) [5,15,24,37,46]. The Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) optimality con-
ditions for each player’s optimization problem can be used together with the semis-
mooth Newton-type method [13, 14, 16]. A GNEP can be transformed to a NEP
with the usage of penalty functions [18,19,23,29]. Gap functions are frequently used
for solving GNEPs [60]. A relaxation method for jointly convex GNEPs, based on
inexact line search and Nikaido-Isoda functions, is given in [61]. A study on GNEPs
with linear coupling constraints and mixed-integer variables is in [56]. Facchinei
et al. [20] proposed the Gauss-Seidel method for solving GNEPs. Its main idea is
to solve each player’s optimization problem alternatively. We also refer to [53, 54]
for studies on the Gauss-Seidel method for solving GNEPs with discrete and mixed
integer variables. Convergence of the Gauss-Seidel method can be shown for some
special GNEPs, such as generalized potential games (GPGs). We refer to [20,35,55]
for studies on potential games and GPGs. Most of the existing methods assume
that each individual player’s optimization problem is convex. For more work about
GNEPs, we refer to the surveys [17, 22].
1.2 Contributions
In this paper, we use the Gauss-Seidel method introduced in [20] for solving
GNEPPs. This method requires to get global minimizers for the occurring opti-
mization problems in each loop. Although the Gauss-Seidel method is not theo-
retically guaranteed to converge for all GNEPPs, it converges for many problems
in the computational practice. For some special GNEPs, the convergence can be
guranteed for the Gauss-Seidel method. Generalized potential games (GPGs) are
such GNEPs [20]. We would like to remark that the Gauss-Seidel method can be
applied to a GNEPP even if it is not a GPG, while the convergence is not guaran-
teed. In practice, the method works well for many GNEPPs that are not GPGs.
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In [20], it was shown that if a GNEP is in some special forms, then it is a GPG (see
section 4). In section 4, we give the first numerical method for verifying GPGs.
Our major results are:
• We use the Lasserre type Moment-SOS relaxations [32] to find global min-
imizers of the occurring polynomial optimization problems in each loop
of the Gauss-Seidel method. These relaxations can solve the polynomial
optimization problems globally, even if they are nonconvex.
• As demonstrated in section 5, the Gauss-Seidel method works well in prac-
tice. Moment-SOS relaxations can be used to verify if a computed solution
is a GNE or not. There are no other numerical methods for solving GNEPPs
efficiently, especially for nonconvex ones, to the best of the authors’ knowl-
edge.
• We give a sufficient condition for checking if a given GNEPP is a GPG or
not. Based on it, a numerical certificate is given for checking GPGs. This
is the first numerical method that can do this, to the best of the authors’
knowledge.
The paper is organized as follows. Some preliminaries about polynomial op-
timization are given in Section 2. Section 3 gives the Gauss-Seidel method for
solving GNEPPs and studies its properties, and the algorithm of solving the oc-
curring polynomial optimization problems globally in the Gauss-Seidel method.
Section 4 focuses on generalized potential games. Numerical experiments are given
in Section 5.
2. Preliminaries
The symbol N stands for the set of nonnegative integers, and R for the real field.
The norm ‖ · ‖ is the standard Euclidean norm of a vector. For a real number t,
⌈t⌉ (resp., ⌊t⌋) denotes the smallest integer not smaller than t (resp., the biggest
integer not bigger than t).
The variable xi ∈ Rni is the strategy of the ith player, and xi,j denotes the
jth component of xi, for j = 1, . . . , ni. In the Gauss-Seidel method, we use x
(k)
i
to denote the value of xi in the kth loop. Similarly, x
(k)
i,j denotes xi,j in the kth
iteration. In each loop of the Gauss-Seidel method, we need to solve a polynomial
optimization problem about the ith player’s strategy vector xi := (xi,1, . . . , xi,ni).
Let R[xi] denote the ring of real polynomials in xi, and for a degree d, R[xi]d
denotes the space of all polynomials in xi whose degrees are at most d. For xi :=
(xi,1, . . . , xi,ni) and α := (α1, . . . , αni) ∈ Nni , denote
xαi := x
α1
i,1 · · ·x
αni
i,ni
, |α| := α1 + · · ·+ αni .
For an integer d > 0, denote the set
N
ni
d := {α ∈ Nni : |α| ≤ d}.
We use [xi]d to denote the vector of all monomials in xi and whose degree is at most
d, ordered in the graded alphabetical ordering. For example, if xi = (xi,1, xi,2), then
[xi]3 = (1, xi,1, xi,2, x
2
i,1, xi,1xi,2, x
2
i,2, x
3
i,1, x
2
i,1xi,2, xi,1x
2
i,2, x
3
i,2).
A polynomial σ ∈ R[xi] is said to be a sum of squares (SOS) if σ = s21+s22+ · · ·+s2k
for some polynomials s1, . . . , sk ∈ R[xi]. The set of all SOS polynomials in xi is
THE GAUSS-SEIDEL METHOD FOR GNEPPS 5
denoted as Σ[xi]. For a degree d, we denote the truncation
Σ[xi]d := Σ[xi] ∩ R[xi]d.
For a tuple g = (g1, . . . , gt) of polynomials in xi, its quadratic module is the set
Qmod(g) = Σ[xi] + g1 · Σ[xi] + · · ·+ gt · Σ[xi].
The truncation of Qmod(g) with degree 2d is the set
Qmod(g)2d = Σ[xi]2d + g1 · Σ[xi]2d−deg(g1) + · · ·+ gt · Σ[xi]2d−deg(gt).
The tuple g defines the basic closed semi-algebraic set
(2.1) S(g) = {xi ∈ Rni : g(xi) ≥ 0}.
The quadratic module Qmod(g) is said to be archimedean if there exists p ∈
Qmod(g) such that the set S(p) is compact. If Qmod(g) is archimedean, then S(g)
must be compact. Conversely, if S(g) is compact, say, S(g) is contained in the ball
S(R−‖xi‖2), then Qmod(g,R−‖xi‖2) is archimedean and S(g) = S(g,R−‖xi‖2).
For a polynomial f ∈ R[x], if f ∈ Qmod(g), then it is clear that f ≥ 0 on S(g).
The reverse is not necessarily true. However, when Qmod(g) is archimedean, if
f > 0 on S(g), then f ∈ Qmod(g). This conclusion is referred to as Putinar’s
Positivstellensatz [48]. Interestingly, if f ≥ 0 on S(g), we still have f ∈ Qmod(g),
under some optimality conditions [43].
3. The Gauss-Seidel method for GNEPPs
The Gauss-Seidel method was introduced in [20] for solving GNEPs. The fol-
lowing is the general framework of the Gauss-Seidel method.
Algorithm 3.1. For the GNEP of (1.1), do the following:
Step 1. Choose a feasible starting point x(0) = (x
(0)
1 , . . . , x
(0)
N ), a positive regu-
larization parameter τ (0) and let k := 0.
Step 2. If x(k) satisfies a suitable termination criterion, stop.
Step 3. For i = 1, . . . , N, compute a global minimizer x
(k+1)
i of the optimization
(3.1)
{
min
xi∈R
ni
fi(x
(k+1)
1 , . . . , x
(k+1)
i−1 , xi, x
(k)
i+1, . . . , x
(k)
N ) + τ
(k)‖xi − x(k)i ‖2
s.t. gi(x
(k+1)
1 , . . . , x
(k+1)
i−1 , xi, x
(k)
i+1, . . . , x
(k)
N ) ≥ 0.
Step 4. Choose a new regularization parameter τ (k+1) ∈ [0, τ (k)].
Step 5. Let x(k+1) := (x
(k+1)
1 , . . . , x
(k+1)
N ), k := k + 1, and go to Step 2.
In practice, Algorithm 3.1 performs well for solving GNEPPs. It can compute
equilibria for many problems. This is demonstrated in numerical experiments in
Section 5. The GNEPPs are very hard to be solved by other existing methods,
to the best of the authors’ knowledge. On the other hand, Algorithm 3.1 is not
theoretically guaranteed to converge for all GNEPPs. Its convergence can be shown
for some special GNEPs, such as GPGs. In the following, we show how to implement
Algorithm 3.1 when the defining functions are polynomials. After that, we review
some properties of Algorithm 3.1.
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3.1 Moment-SOS relaxations for polynomial optimization
We discuss how to implement Algorithm 3.1 when all the objective and constrain-
ing functions are given by polynomials. In its Step 3, the sub-optimization (3.1) is
a polynomial optimization problem whose variable is xi ∈ Rni . In the following,
we give a brief review for using the Lasserre type Moment-SOS hierarchy to solve
(3.1). We refer to [31, 32, 42, 43] for related work about polynomial optimization.
For an even degree 2d > 0, let RN
ni
2d denote the space of all real vectors that are
labeled by α ∈ Nni2d. Each y ∈ RN
ni
2d is labeled as
y = (yα)α∈Nni2d
.
Such y is called a truncated multi-sequence (tms) of degree 2d. For a polynomial
f =
∑
α∈Nn
2d
fαx
α
i ∈ R[x]2d, define the operation
(3.2) 〈f, y〉 =
∑
α∈Nn2d
fαyα.
The operation 〈f, y〉 is linear in y for fixed f and it is linear in f for fixed y. For
a polynomial q ∈ R[xi]2d and the integer t = d − ⌈deg(q)/2⌉, the outer product
q · [xi]t[xi]Tt is a symmetric matrix of length
(
n+t
t
)
. It can be expanded as
q · [xi]t[xi]Tt =
∑
α∈Nn2d
xαi Qα,
for some symmetric matrices Qα. We denote
(3.3) L(d)q [y] :=
∑
α∈Nn2d
yαQα.
It is called the dth localizing matrix of q and generated by y. For given q, L
(d)
q [y] is
linear in y. Clearly, if q(u) ≥ 0 and y = [u]2d, then
L(d)q [y] = q(u)[u]t[u]
T
t  0.
For instance, if ni = d = 2 and q = 1− xi,1 − xi,1xi,2, then
L(2)q [y] =

y00 − y10 − y11 y10 − y20 − y21 y01 − y11 − y12y10 − y20 − y21 y20 − y30 − y31 y11 − y21 − y22
y01 − y11 − y12 y11 − y21 − y22 y02 − y12 − y13

 .
When q = 1 is the constant one polynomial, the localizing matrix L
(d)
1 [y] reduces
to a moment matrix, which we denote as
Md[y] := L
(d)
1 [y].
When q := (q1, . . . , qs) is a tuple of polynomials, we then define that
L(d)
q
[y] :=


L
(d)
q1 [y]
L
(d)
q2 [y]
. . .
L
(d)
qs [y]

 .
In the following, we discuss how to solve (3.1). For convenience, denote
(3.4)
{
f
(k)
i := fi(x
(k+1)
1 , . . . , x
(k+1)
i−1 , xi, x
(k)
i+1, . . . , x
(k)
N ) + τ
(k)‖xi − x(k)i ‖2,
g
(k)
i := gi(x
(k+1)
1 , . . . , x
(k+1)
i−1 , xi, x
(k)
i+1, . . . , x
(k)
N ).
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They are polynomials in xi. One can rewrite (3.1) equivalently as
(3.5)
{
ϑmin = min
xi∈R
ni
f
(k)
i (xi)
s.t. g
(k)
i (xi) ≥ 0.
Denote the degree
d0 := max{⌈deg(f (k)i )/2⌉, ⌈deg(g(k)i )/2⌉}.
For d = d0, d0 + 1, . . ., the dth moment relaxation for (3.5) is
(3.6)


ϑd := min
y
〈
f
(k)
i , y
〉
s.t. Md[y]  0, L(d)
g
(k)
i
 0,
y0 = 1, y ∈ RN
ni
2d .
Its dual optimization problem is the SOS relaxation
(3.7)
{
max γ
s.t. f
(k)
i − γ ∈ Qmod(g(k)i )2d.
We refer to Section 2 for the truncated quadratic module Qmod(g
(k)
i )2d. By solving
the relaxations (3.6)-(3.7) for d = d0, d0+1, . . ., we get the Moment-SOS hierarchy
for solving (3.5). The following is the algorithm.
Algorithm 3.2. (The Moment-SOS hierarchy for solving (3.5)). Let f
(k)
i , g
(k)
i be
as in (3.4). Start with d := d0.
Step 1. Solve the semidefinite relaxation (3.6). If (3.6) is infeasible, then (3.5)
has no feasible points and stop; otherwise, solve it for a minimizer y∗ and let
t := d1, where d1 := ⌈deg(g(k)i )/2⌉.
Step 2. If y∗ satisfies the rank condition
(3.8) rankMt[y
∗] = rankMt−d1 [y
∗],
then extract r := rankMt(y
∗) minimizers for (3.5) and stop.
Step 3. If (3.8) fails to hold and t < d, let t := t + 1 and then go to Step 2;
otherwise, let d := d+ 1 and go to Step 1.
The rank condition (3.8) is called flat truncation in the literature [42]. It is a
sufficient (and almost necessary) condition for checking convergence of the Moment-
SOS hierarchy. Flat truncation is useful for solving truncated moment problems and
linear optimization with moment constraints [21, 25, 44]. Indeed, the Moment-SOS
hierarchy has finite convergence if and only if the flat truncation is satisfied for some
relaxation order, under some generic conditions [42]. When (3.8) holds, the method
in [26] can be used to extract r minimizers for (3.5). The method is implemented in
the software GloptPoly 3 [27]. We refer to [26], [42] and [32, Chapter 6] for more
details.
The convergence properties of Algorithm 3.2 are as follows. By solving the
hierarchy of relaxations (3.6)-(3.7), we can get a monotonically increasing sequence
of lower bounds {ϑd}∞d=d0 for the minimum value ϑmin, i.e.,
ϑd0 ≤ ϑd0+1 ≤ · · · ≤ ϑmin.
When Qmod(g
(k)
i ) is archimedean, we have ϑd → ϑmin as d→∞, as shown in [31].
If ϑd = ϑmin for some d, the relaxation (3.6) is said to be exact (or tight) for solving
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(3.1). For such a case, the Moment-SOS hierarchy is said to have finite convergence.
The Moment-SOS hierarchy has finite convergence when the archimedean and some
optimality conditions hold [43]. Although there exist special polynomials such that
the Moment-SOS hierarchy fails to have finite convergence, such special problems
belong to a set of measure zero in the space of input polynomials [43].
3.2 Some properties of Algorithm 3.1
Although Algorithm 3.1 converges for many problems, it is possible that it does
not converge for some special ones. For instance, it is possible that (3.1) becomes
infeasible after some loops even if the starting point x(0) is feasible. The following
is such an example.
Example 3.3. Consider the 2-player GNEP
(3.9)
min
x1∈R1
−x1 − x2 min
x2∈R1
x1x2
s.t. 0 ≤ x1 ≤ 2 s.t. x1 + (x2)2 ≤ 1.
If Algorithm 3.1 begins with (x
(0)
1 , x
(0)
2 ) = (0, 1) and uses the constant τ
(k) = 0.05,
then x
(1)
1 = 2 and (3.1) is infeasible for k = 1 and i = 2.
When a GNEP has a shared constraint, i.e., there exists a set X ⊆ Rn such that
Xi(x−i) = {xi : (xi, x−i) ∈ X} for all players, then the suboptimization (3.1) is
feasible for all k, provided that the initial point x(0) is feasible [20]. Beyond the
concern of infeasibility, the sequence of x(k) produced by Algorithm 3.1 might be
alternating and does not converge. Let’s see the following example.
Example 3.4. Consider the 2-player GNEP
(3.10)
min
x1∈R1
x1 min
x2∈R1
x1x2
s.t. x1 ≥ x2 s.t. (x1)2 + (x2)2 = 2.
If Algorithm 3.1 starts with (x
(0)
1 , x
(0)
2 ) = (1, 1) and uses the constant τ
(k) = 0.001,
the sub-optimization (3.1) for the first player is{
min
x1∈R1
x1 + 0.001(x1 − 1)2
s.t. x1 ≥ 1.
Its minimizer x
(1)
1 = 1. After plugging (x
(1)
1 , x
(0)
2 ) into (3.1), the sub-optimization
(3.1) for the second player is{
min
x2∈R1
x2 + 0.001(x2 − 1)2
s.t. x22 = 1,
whose minimizer x
(1)
2 = −1. After one iteration, Algorithm 3.1 produced the point
x(1) = (1,−1). For the loop of k = 1, the sub-optimization problem (3.1) for the
first player is {
min
x1∈R1
x1 + 0.001(x1 − 1)2
s.t. x1 ≥ −1,
whose minimizer x
(2)
1 = −1, and the sub-optimization (3.1) for the second player is{
min
x2∈R1
−x2 + 0.001(x2 + 1)2
s.t. x22 = 1,
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whose minimizer x
(2)
2 = 1. So, (x
(2)
1 , x
(2)
2 ) = (−1, 1). Continuing this process, one
can show that x(k) is alternating in the pattern
(1, 1) −→ (1,−1) −→ (−1,−1) −→ (−1, 1) −→ (1, 1) −→ · · · .
Algorithm 3.1 does not converge for this GNEP.
We would like to remark that even for the case that Algorithm 3.1 converges,
the limit of x(k) is not necessarily a GNE for (1.1). This is shown in the following
example.
Example 3.5. Consider the GNEP in (1.4). For the first player, when x2 > 0, its
feasible set is x1 ≥ x2 + 1, so the sub-optimization (3.1) in the kth loop is
(3.11)

 minx1∈R1 x1 + τ
(k)(x1 − x(k)1 )2
s.t. x1 ≥ 1 + x(k)2 .
For 0 < τ (k) < 0.5, the minimizer of (3.11) is 1 + x
(k)
2 . For the second player, the
sub-optimization (3.1) in the kth loop is
(3.12)

 minx2∈R1 (x2)
2 − x2x(k)2 + τ (k)(x2 − x(k)2 )2
s.t. (x2)
2 ≤ 3− (x(k)2 + 1)2, x2 ≥ 0.
When (3.12) is feasible, its minimizer is
min
{
1 + 2τ (k)
2 + 2τ (k)
x
(k)
2 ,
√
3− (x(k)2 + 1)2
}
.
Therefore, for any constant 0 < τ (k) < 0.5 or a decreasing τ (k) with τ (0) < 0.5, if
0 < x
(0)
2 ≤
√
3−1 (to make (3.12) feasible), then x(k) → (1, 0) as k →∞. However,
(1, 0) is not a GNE, because when x2 = 0, x1 = 0 is feasible and it is the minimizer.
Indeed, (0, 0) is a GNE. This shows that a limit point produced by Algorithm 3.1
is not necessarily a GNE.
In practice, however, the performance of Algorithm 3.1 is good. Under certain
conditions, Algorithm 3.1 converges and the limit is a GNE. This requires some
assumptions on the feasible sets of (1.2). Let G be a set-valued map defined on
a set U , i.e., G(x) is a subset of a range Y , for all x ∈ U . Its domain, domG,
is the set of x ∈ U such that G(x) 6= ∅ [4]. The map G is said to be inner
semicontinuous at x ∈ U relative to domG if for all y ∈ G(x) and for all sequences
{xℓ} ⊆ domG such that that xℓ → x, there exists a sequence of yℓ ∈ G(xℓ)
converging to y. The map G is called inner semicontinuous relative to domG if it
is inner semicontinuous relative to domG at every point in domG. For instance,
if the set Xi(x−i) = {xi : (xi, x−i) ∈ Ci} for Ci ⊆ Rn being a polyhedron or a
ball, then the set-valued map x−i 7→ Xi(x−i) is inner semicontinuous relative to its
domain at all points x−i [51]. However, for the GNEP in (1.4), the set-valued map
x2 → X1(x2) is not inner semicontinuous at (0, 0) (see the end of this section). We
refer to [6, 51] for the inner semicontinuity of set-valued maps. The following is a
useful lemma about inner semicontinuity.
Lemma 3.6. For two closed sets U and V , let f : U×V → R and h : U×V → Rm
be two continuous functions. For y ∈ V , define the set-valued map
G(y) = {x ∈ U : h(x, y) ≥ 0}.
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Consider two sequences {x(k)} ⊆ domG and {y(k)} ⊆ V such that x(k) → x∗ and
y(k) → y∗. Suppose 0 ≤ τ (k) → 0 as k →∞. Assume that each x(k) is a minimizer
of the optimization problem
(3.13)
{
min
x∈U
f(x, y(k)) + τ (k)‖x− x(k−1)‖2,
s.t. h(x, y(k)) ≥ 0.
If the set-valued map G(y) is inner semicontinuous relative to domG, then x∗ is
also a minimizer of
(3.14)
{
min
x∈U
f(x, y∗)
s.t. h(x, y∗) ≥ 0.
Proof. We prove it by a contradiction argument. Suppose otherwise that x∗ is not
a minimizer of (3.14), then there exists z∗ ∈ G(y∗) such that
(3.15) f(z∗, y∗) < f(x∗, y∗).
Since the mapping G is inner semicontinuous, there exists a sequence of z(k) such
that z(k) → z∗ and z(k) ∈ G(y(k)). The sequence {z(k)} is clearly bounded. Because
xk is a minimizer of
min f(x, y(k)) + τ (k)‖x− x(k−1)‖2
s.t. x ∈ G(y(k)),
we have that
(3.16) f(z(k), y(k)) + τ (k)‖z(k) − x(k−1)‖2 ≥ f(x(k), y(k)) + τ (k)‖x(k) − x(k−1)‖2.
Because f(x, y) is continuous, it holds that
f(x(k), y(k))→ f(x∗, y∗), f(zk, yk)→ f(z∗, y∗)
as k→∞. For all ε > 0, there exists K1 such that
f(x(k), y(k))− f(x∗, y∗) > − ε4 ,
f(z(k), y(k))− f(z∗, y∗) < ε4
for all k > K1. Combining the two inequalities, we can get
f(x(k), y(k))− f(z(k), y(k)) + f(z∗, y∗)− f(x∗, y∗) > −ε
2
.
Therefore, we have
(3.17) f(z∗, y∗)− f(x∗, y∗) + ε
2
> f(z(k), y(k))− f(x(k), y(k))
≥ τ (k)
(
‖x(k) − x(k−1)‖2 − ‖z(k) − x(k−1)‖2
)
.
The last inequality follows from (3.16). Because {x(k)}, {z(k)} are convergent se-
quences and τ (k) → 0, there must exist K2 such that
τ (k)(‖x(k) − x(k−1)‖2 − ‖z(k) − x(k−1)‖2) > −ε
2
whenever k > K2. Let K := max{K1,K2}, then for all k > K
f(z∗, y∗)− f(x∗, y∗) + ε > 0.
Since ε can be arbitrarily small, the above implies that
f(z∗, y∗)− f(x∗, y∗) ≥ 0,
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which contradicts (3.15). Therefore, x∗ is a minimizer of (3.14). 
Lemma 3.6 immediately implies the following result.
Theorem 3.7. Let x(k) be the sequence produced by Algorithm 3.1 for the GNEP
of (1.1). Assume that x(k) → x∗ and τ (k) → 0. If for each i the set-valued map
Gi : x−i 7→ Xi(x−i) is inner semicontinuous relative to its domain domGi, then
the limit x∗ is a GNE for the GNEP of (1.1).
Remark. Theorem 3.7 assumes that the sequence of x(k) produced by Algorithm 3.1
converges. However, the theorem does not give a sufficient condition for this se-
quence to converge. To ensure convergence, we need to assume the GNEPs are
GPGs; see Theorems 4.3 and 4.4. There exists a convergence result [55, Lemma 1]
that is similar to Lemma 3.6 and Theorem 3.7.
In the proof of Lemma 3.6, it is required that τ (k) → 0, which is also assumed
in Theorem 3.7. However, in the implementation of Algorithm 3.1, we do not need
τ (k) → 0. Sometimes, a constant τ (k) works very well. We refer to Theorem 4.4
and examples in Section 5.
For Examples 3.3 and 3.4, Algorithm 3.1 does not produce a convergent sequence.
For Example 3.5, the set-valued map G1 : x2 7→ X1(x2) for the first player is
not inner semicontinuous relative to its domain domG1. In fact, at the point
(x1, x2) = (0, 0), it is clear that x1 ∈ G1(x2). However, for every sequence {x(k)2 }
such that 0 < x
(k)
2 → x2 = 0, G1(x(k)2 ) = [x(k)2 + 1,∞). Since each x(k)2 > 0,
there does not exist a sequence {x(k)1 } converging to x1 = 0 and x(k)1 ∈ G1(x(k)2 ) =
[x
(k)
2 + 1,∞). Therefore, the inner semicontinuity assumption in Theorem 3.7 fails
for Example 3.5.
4. Generalized potential games
The Gauss-Seidel method is frequently used for solving GNEPs. However, its
convergence is not guaranteed for all of them. One wonders for what kind of GNEPs
the Gauss-Seidel method converges. The generalized potential game (GPG) is such
a GNEP. The following is the definition of GPGs in [20].
Definition 4.1. ( [20]) The GNEP of (1.1) is a generalized potential game if:
(i) There exists a closed set ∅ 6= X ⊆ Rn such that
Xi(x−i) ≡ {xi ∈ Di : (xi, x−i) ∈ X}
for all players, where each Di ⊆ Rni is a closed set such that (D1 × · · · ×
DN ) ∩X 6= ∅.
(ii) There exist a continuous function P (x) : Rn → R and a forcing function
σ : R+ → R+ (i.e., limk→∞ σ(tk) = 0 implies limk→∞ tk = 0) such that for
all yi, xi ∈ Xi(x−i)
(4.1)
fi(yi, x−i)− fi(xi, x−i) > 0 =⇒
P (yi, x−i)− P (xi, x−i) ≥ σ(fi(yi, x−i)− fi(xi, x−i)).
The item (i) in Definition 4.1 is from the concept of shared constraint [17]. It
implies that if x(0) is feasible, then the sub-optimization problem (3.1) is feasible
for all k and i. The item (ii) means that there exists a single “dominant function”
P that measures the changes on each player’s objective functions [20].
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Some special GNEPs can be directly verified as GPGs. For instance, for the
GNEP of (1.1), if each objective fi can be expressed as
(4.2) fi(x) = f0(x) +
M∑
j=1
fi,j(xj)
for some functions f0 and fi,j and the item (i) holds, then the GNEP of (1.1) is a
GPG because P, σ can be chosen as
P (x) = f0(x) +
N∑
i=1
M∑
j=1
fi,j(xj), σ(t) = t.
One can easily check that the above P (x) and σ(t) satisfy (4.1) [35].
GPGs are extensions of potential games, which were originally introduced for
NEPs [35]. They have broad applications [40]. The following is an example of
GPG arising from applications.
Example 4.2. The GNEPP from the environmental pollution control, described
in the introduction, is a GPG. The functions P and σ can be chosen as
P (x) = 2
N∏
i=1
(xi,0 −
N∑
j=1
γj,ixj,i) +
N∑
i=1
[
N∑
j=0
xi,j −
N∑
j=1
γj,ixj,i − xi,0(bi − 1/2xi,0)
]
,
σ(t) = t.
The numerical results of Algorithm 3.1 are shown in the next section.
The following is the convergence result for Algorithm 3.1 when it is applied to
solve GPGs.
Theorem 4.3. ( [20, Theorem 5.2]) Consider the GNEP of (1.1) such that all the
functions are continuous. Assume that (1.1) is a GPG and each set-valued map
Gi : x−i 7→ Xi(x−i) is inner semicontinuous relative to its domain. In Algorithm
3.1, suppose each x
(k+1)
i is a minimizer of (3.1) and the parameters τ
(k) are updated
as
(4.3) τ (k+1) := max
{
min
[
τ (k), max
i=1,...,N
(‖x(k+1)i − x(k)i ‖)
]
, 0.1τ (k)
}
.
Then every limit point of the sequence {x(k)}∞k=0 produced by Algorithm 3.1 is a
GNE for (1.1).
The updating scheme (4.3) for τ (k) is a bit complicated. However, if each player’s
optimization problem (1.2) is convex, then the parameter τ (k) can be chosen to be
constant.
Theorem 4.4. ( [20, Theorem 4.3]) Consider the GNEP of (1.1) such that all the
functions are continuous. Assume that (1.1) is a GPG and each set-valued map
Gi : x−i 7→ Xi(x−i) is inner semicontinuous relative to its domain. Suppose the
objectives fi( · , x−i) and the feasible sets Xi(x−i) are all convex. In Algorithm 3.1,
suppose each x
(k+1)
i is a minimizer of (3.1) and the parameter τ
(k) = τ > 0 is a
constant. Then every limit point of the sequence {x(k)}∞k=0 produced by Algorithm
3.1 is a GNE for (1.1).
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Beyond GPGs, the Gauss-Seidel method has convergence for GNEPs with dis-
crete strategy sets [53] or mixed-integer variables [54]. In general, when (1.1) is
not a GPG, the convergence of Algorithm 3.1 is not known very much. We have
seen examples in Section 3 such that Algorithm 3.1 fails to converge. On the other
hand, the performance of Algorithm 3.1 is actually very good in our computational
experiments (see Section 5). In the following, we discuss how to certify that a
GNEP is a GPG.
4.1 A certificate for GPGs
Generally, it is hard to check whether a GNEP is a GPG or not. The main
challenge is to verify the item (ii) in Definition 4.1. In this subsection, we give a
certificate for (4.1) to hold. For the ith player, denote the set
(4.4) Ki =
{
(xi, yi, x−i) ∈ Rni × Rni × Rn−ni
∣∣∣∣ xi, yi ∈ Xi(x−i)fi(yi, x−i)− fi(xi, x−i) ≥ 0
}
.
For convenience, denote the differences of functions
(4.5)
{ △Pi := P (yi, x−i)− P (xi, x−i),
△fi := fi(yi, x−i)− fi(xi, x−i).
The following lemma is straightforward for verification.
Lemma 4.5. For the GNEP of (1.1), if the item (i) in Definition 4.1 holds, and
there exist polynomials P ∈ R[x], pi,0, pi,1 ∈ R[xi, yi, x−i] (i = 1, . . . , N) such that
pi,0 ≥ 0, pi,1 ≥ 0 on Ki and
(4.6) △Pi = (pi,0 + 1)△fi + pi,1
for all i, then (1.1) is a GPG.
In the equation (4.6), we can replace the constant 1 by any positive number
ǫ > 0, up to scaling coefficients. For numerical reasons, we prefer the constant
1. Lemma 4.5 gives a certificate for GPGs. The following are examples of GPGs
certified by (4.6).
Example 4.6. Consider the 2-player GNEP with the sets
X = {(x1, x2) : 1 ≤ x1, x2 ≤ 10, x1 ≥ x2},
X1(x−1) = {x1 : (x1, x2) ∈ X}, X2(x−2) = {x2 : (x1, x2) ∈ X}.
The two players’ optimization problems are respectively
(4.7) min
x1∈X1
x1 + x2 min
x2∈X2
−x1x2.
Let P (x1, x2) = (x1)
3 − x1x2 + x1, we have
(4.8)


△P1 = (y1 − x1)[(y1 − x1)2 + 1] + (3y1x1 − x2)(y1 − x1),
△P2 = −x1(y2 − x2),
△f1 = y1 − x1,
△f2 = −x1(y2 − x2).
The equation (4.6) is satisfied for
p1,0 = (y1 − x1)2, p1,1 = (3y1x1 − x2)(y1 − x1), p2,0 = p2,1 = 0.
It is clear that p1,0, p2,0, p2,1 are nonnegative. By the definition of K1, △f1 ≥ 0,
and 3y1x1 − x2 ≥ 3y1 − x2 ≥ 0, so p1,1 ≥ 0 on K1.
14 JIAWANG NIE, XINDONG TANG, AND LINGLING XU
Example 4.7. Consider the 2-player GNEP with the sets
X = {(x1, x2) : (x1)3 + (x2)3 ≤ 2, x1 ≥ 6x2},
X1(x−1) = {x1 : (x1, x2) ∈ X}, X2(x−2) = {x2 : (x1, x2) ∈ X}.
The two players’ optimization problems are respectively
(4.9)
min
x1∈X1
(x1)
2x2 + (x2)
2x1 − 4(x1)4 min
x2∈X2
x1x2 − 3(x2)2
s.t. x1 ≥ 0, s.t. x2 ≥ 0.125.
For P (x1, x2) = (x1)
2x2 + (x2)
2x1 − 4(x1)4,
(4.10)


△P1 = △f1 = (y1)2x2 + (y2)2x1 − 4(y1)4
−(x1)2x2 − (x2)2x1 + 4(x1)4,
△P2 = (x1)2(y2 − x2) + x1((y2)2 − (x2)2),
△f2 = x1(y2 − x2)− 3(y2)2 + 3(x2)2.
The equation (4.6) holds with
p1,0 = 0, p1,1 = 0, p2,0 = x1, p2,1 = (y2 − x2)[4x1(y2 + x2) + 3(y2 + x2)− x1].
Clearly, p1,0, p1,1, p2,0 ≥ 0. Note that
△f2 = (y2 − x2)(x1 − 3(y2 + x2)) ≥ 0
on K2. Then, either x1 − 3(y2 + x2) > 0 hence y2 − x2 ≥ 0, or x1 − 3(y2 + x2) = 0,
which forces y2 − x2 = 0. This is because x1 ≥ 6y2, x1 ≥ 6x2 and y2, x2 > 0, if
x1 − 3(y2 + x2) = 0, then the only possible case is x1 = 6y2 = 6x2. Thus from
4x1(y2 + x2) + 3(y2 + x2)− x1 > x1(4y2 + 4x2 − 1) ≥ 0,
we know p2,1 ≥ 0 on K2.
Example 4.8. Consider the 2-player GNEP with the sets
X =

(x1, x2)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
x1 = (x1,1, x1,2) ∈ R2, x2 ∈ R,
x1,1, x1,2, x2 ≥ 0.5,
x2 − 0.3 ≤ x1,1 + x1,2 ≤ x2 + 0.3

 ,
and X1(x−1) = {x1 : (x1, x2) ∈ X}, X2(x−2) = {x2 : (x1, x2) ∈ X}. The optimiza-
tion problems are respectively
(4.11)
min
x1∈X1
x1,1x2 + x1,2x2 min
x2∈X2
x1,1 · x1,2 · x2
s.t. ‖x1‖ = 2
For P (x1, x2) = (x1,1 + x1,2 + 1)
3x2,
(4.12)


△P1 = x2((y1,1 + y1,2 + 1)3 − (x1,1 + x1,2 + 1)3),
△P2 = (y2 − x2)(x1,1 + x1,2 + 1)3,
△f1 = x2(y1,1 + y1,2 − x1,1 − x1,2),
△f2 = x1,1x1,2(y2 − z2).
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The equation (4.6) holds with
p1,0 = (y1,1 + y1,2 + 1)
2 + (x1,1 + x1,2 + 1)
2 + (y1,1 + y1,2)(x1,1 + x1,2)
+y1,1 + y1,2 + x1,1 + x1,2,
p1,1 = 0,
p2,0 = 3x1,1 + 3x1,2 + 5,
p2,1 = (y2 − x2)
[
(x1,1)
3 + (x1,2)
3 + 3(x1,1)
2 +
3(x1,2)
2 + 3x1,1 + 3x1,2 + 1
]
.
The equality △P1 = (1 + p1,0)△f1 follows from the identity
a3 − b3 = (a− b)(a2 + ab+ b2)
with a = y1,1 + y1,2 + 1 and b = x1,1 + x1,2 + 1. Clearly, p1,0, p1,1 ≥ 0 on K1, and
p2,0 ≥ 0 on K2. Since x1,1x1,2 > 0, △f2 ≥ 0 implies y2−x2 ≥ 0, so p2,1 ≥ 0 on K2.
4.2 Putinar Positivstellensatz for the certificate
Lemma 4.5 gives a convenient certificate for checking GPGs. One needs to
find polynomials pi,0, pi,1 and P satisfying (4.6) and pi,0, pi,1 ≥ 0 on Ki. For
a polynomial tuple h, we have seen that if p ∈ Qmod(h), then p ≥ 0 on the
semialgebraic set S(h). This motivates us to use Putinar’s Positivstellensatz for
verifying that.
For the set Ki as in (4.4), let hi := (hi,t)
mi
t=1 be a tuple of polynomials in
R[xi, yi, x−i] such that
Ki = {(xi, yi, x−i) : hi(xi, yi, x−i) ≥ 0}.
Moreover, let hi,0 = 1 for all i. When the item (i) in Definition 4.1 holds, the
GNEP of (1.1) is a GPG if there exist P ∈ R[x] and qi,0, qi,1 ∈ Qmod(hi) such that
(4.13) △Pi = (qi,0 + 1)△fi + qi,1
for all players. For an even degree 2d, we parameterize P, qi,0, qi,1 as
P (x) = pT [x]2d, qi,0 =
∑mi
t=0
(
[x, yi]d−dit
)T ·Qti,0 · ([x, yi]d−dit) · hi,t,
qi,1 =
∑mi
t=0
(
[x, yi]d−dit
)T ·Qti,1 · ([x, yi]d−dit) · hi,t.
In the above, the degree dit = ⌈deg(hi,t)/2⌉.One can show that qi,0, qi,1 ∈ Qmod(hi)
if and only if there exist psd matrices Qti,0, Q
t
i,1 in the above parametrization, for
some d [32, Chapter 2]. For notational convenience, denote
(4.14) Q :=
(
Qti,0, Q
t
i,1
)
i=1,...,N,t=1,...,mi
.
Therefore, the certificate (4.6) in Lemma 4.5 can be checked by solving the semi-
definite program
(4.15)


min
p,Q
∑
i,t
trace
(
Qti,0 +Q
t
i,1
)
s.t. △Pi ≡ (qi,0 + 1)△fi + qi,1 (∀ i),
P ∈ R[x]2d,
Qti,0  0, Qti,1  0 (∀ i, t).
The certificate given by solving (4.15) does not require to have priori polynomials
P, qi,0 and qi,1. Instead, the coefficients of these polynomials are variables in (4.15)
that are awaiting to be solved numerically.
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Example 4.9. Consider the 2-player GNEP such that the two players’ optimization
problems are
(4.16)
min
x1∈R1
2x2 − x1 min
x2∈R1
(x1)
2 − 2x1x2 − (x2)2
s.t. (x1)
2 + (x2)
2 ≤ 1, s.t. (x1)2 + (x2)2 ≤ 1,
x1 ≥ 0, x2 ≥ 0.
The ∆f1 = x1−y1, ∆f2 = 2x1(x2−y2)+(x2)2−(y2)2, and the defining polynomial
tuples h1, h2 for the sets K1,K2 are respectively,
h1 = {1− (x1)2 − (x2)2, 1− (y1)2 − (x2)2, x1, y1, ∆f1},
h2 = {1− (x1)2 − (x2)2, 1− (x1)2 − (y2)2, x2, y2, ∆f2}.
For the degree d = 2, the semidefinite program (4.15) becomes
(4.17)

min
p,Q
2∑
i=1
6∑
t=0
trace
(
Qti,0 +Q
t
i,1
)
s.t. pT ([y1, x2]4 − [x]4) =
(
6∑
t=0
[x, y1]
T
2−dit
Qt1,0[x, y1]2−dith1,t + 1
)
·∆f1
+
6∑
t=0
[x, y1]
T
2−dit
Qt1,1[x, y1]2−dith1,t,
pT ([x1, y2]4 − [x]4) =
(
6∑
t=0
[x, y2]
T
2−dit
Qt2,0[x, y2]2−dith2,t + 1
)
·∆f2
+
6∑
t=0
[x, y2]
T
2−dit
Qt2,1[x, y2]2−dith2,t,
p ∈ RN24 ∼= R15, Qti,0  0, Qti,1  0 (∀ i, t).
By solving (4.17), we can numerically verify that this GNEP is a GPG. The com-
puted solution of (4.17) is displayed as follows (the coefficients are displayed with
6 decimal digits)
P (x) = −3.176290x1− 1.000000(x2)2 − 0.000006(x1)2
−2.000000x1x2 + 0.219805(x1)3 − 0.000002(x1)4,
q10(x, y1) = 2.176289+ 0.000006x1 + 2.000000x2 + 0.000006y1
−0.219805(y1)2 + 0.000002(y1)3 − 0.219805(x1)2 + 0.000002(x1)3
−0.219805x1y1 + 0.000002x1(y1)2 + 0.000002(x1)2y1,
q11(x, y1) = q20(x, y2) = q21(x, y2) = 0.
The semidefinite program (4.15) is useful for checking GPGs. For instance,
GNEPPs in Example 5.3 and 5.4 are numerically checked to be GPGs by solving
(4.15). Moreover, the problems A11-13,A15,A17-A18 in [19] (see section 5.1) can
be verified to be GPGs in the same way.
5. Numerical experiments
This section reports numerical experiments for solving GNEPPs by using Algo-
rithm 3.1. The subproblem (3.1) is a polynomial optimization problem. We apply
the software GloptiPoly 3 [27] and SeDuMi [58] to solve Moment-SOS relaxations
of (3.1). The semidefinite program (4.15) for certifying GPGs is implemented by the
software YALMIP [33]. The computation is implemented in a Dell XPS 15 9550 Lap-
top, with an Intel® Core(TM) i7-6700HQ CPU at 2.60GHz×4 and 16GB of RAM,
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in a Windows 10 operating system. In the computation, the sequence {x(k)}∞k=0 is
regarded to converge if for some k it holds that
(5.1) ‖x(i) − x(j)‖∞ ≤ 10−8 for all i, j ∈ {k − 10, . . . , k}.
The point x(k) is regarded as a GNE with the accuracy parameter ε > 0 if
(5.2) |fi(x(k))− fi∗| ≤ ε
for all players, where fi
∗ is the minimum value of (1.2) with x−i = x
(k)
−i . Our com-
putational results show that Algorithm 3.1 performs very well for solving GNEPPs,
even if for nonconvex ones. First, we see some examples of the GPGs from Section 4.
Example 5.1. Consider the environmental pollution problem in the introduction
and Example 4.2. We have seen that it is a GPG. Assume the number of players is
N = 2 and the parameters b1 = b2 = 2, E1 = E2 = 1, γ1,1 = 0.7, γ1,2 = 0.9, γ2,1 =
γ2,2 = 0.8. We run Algorithm 3.1 with x
(0)
1,0 = x
(0)
1,1 = · · · = x(0)2,2 = 0.5, and
τ (0) = 0.1, τ (k+1) updated as in (4.3). After 21 iterations, we get
x
(21)
1,0 = 0.9999, x
(21)
1,1 = 0, x
(21)
1,2 = 0, x
(21)
2,0 = 0.7500, x
(21)
2,1 = 0, x
(21)
2,2 = 0.9375.
Its accuracy parameter ε = 1.7856 · 10−8. It costs about 7 seconds.
Example 5.2. i) Consider the GNEP in Example 4.6. It is a GPG. All the in-
dividual optimization problems are convex. We run Algorithm 3.1 with the initial
point (x
(0)
1 , x
(0)
2 ) = (3, 2) and fixed τ
(k) = 0.02, and get a GNE (2.0000, 2.0000)
with ε = 6.1541 · 10−8. It runs 12 iterations and costs 2.6289 seconds.
ii) Consider the GNEP in Example 4.7. It is a GPG. We run Algorithm 3.1 with
the initial point (x
(0)
1 , x
(0)
2 ) = (1, 0.125) and fixed τ
(k) = 0.02. It returns the GNE
(1.2595, 0.1250) with ε = 2.2891 · 10−9. It runs 12 iterations and costs around 2
seconds.
iii) Consider the GNEP in Example 4.8. It is a GPG. All the individual optimization
problems are convex. We run Algorithm 3.1 with the initial point (x
(0)
1,1, x
(0)
1,2, x
(0)
2 ) =
(1, 1, 2) and fixed τ (k) = 0.02. It returns the GNE (1.3229, 0.5000, 1.5229) with
ε = 1.3631 · 10−7. It runs 12 costs around 3 seconds.
iv) Consider the GNEP in Example 4.9. It is numerically verified to be a GPG.
We run Algorithm 3.1 with the initial point (x
(0)
1 , x
(0)
2 ) = (0.2, 0.3) and fixed
τ (k) = 0.02. For k = 12, we get x(12) = (0.9539, 0.3). The iteration difference
is 2.1792 ·10−8 and the GNE accuracy ε = 5.4170 ·10−9. It costs about 1.6 seconds.
Example 5.3. Consider the 2-player GNEP such that the individual optimization
problems are respectively
min
x1∈R2
x1,1(x1,2 + 2x2,1 + 2x2,2) min
x2∈R2
(x1,1)
2 + (x1,2)
2
+x1,2(x2,1 + x2,2) + 2x2,1x2,2 −(x2,1)2 − (x2,2)2
s.t.
2∑
i=1
2∑
j=1
xi,j = 1, s.t.
2∑
i=1
2∑
j=1
xi,j = 1,
x1,1 ≥ 0, x1,2 ≥ 0, x2,1 ≥ 0, x2,2 ≥ 0.
By solving the semidefinite program (4.15), we can numerically check that this
GNEP is a GPG. Run Algorithm 3.1 with the initial points x
(0)
1 = (0.2, 0.3), x
(0)
2 =
(0.2, 0.3) and fixed τ (k) = 0.02. After 19 loops, we get that
x(19) = (0, 0.5, 0, 0.5).
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as a GNE with accuracy parameter ε = 5.1857 · 10−7. It costs about 5.36 seconds.
Example 5.4. Consider the 2-player GNEP whose optimization problems are
min
x1∈R2
−2(x1,2)2 + x2,1x1,2 + x1,1x2,1 min
x2∈R2
(x2,1)
2 − 2x1,2x2,2
−2x1,1x2,2 + (x2,2)2
s.t. x1,1 + x1,2 + x2,1 + x2,2 = 1 s.t. x1,1 + x1,2 + x2,1 + x2,2 = 1
x1,1, x1,2 ≥ 0.1 x2,1, x2,2 ≥ 0.1
By solving the semidefinite program (4.15), one can numerically check that this
GNEP is a GPG. We run Algorithm 3.1 with
x(0) = (0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25), τ (0) = 0.1,
and τ (k+1) updated as (4.3). For k = 12, we get
x(12) = (0.1000, 0.4000, 0.1000, 0.4000),
which is a GNE. The accuracy ε = 1.14611 · 10−8. It costs around 2.7 seconds.
Example 5.5. Consider the GNEP whose optimization problems are
min
x1∈R2
(x1,1)
2 + (x1,2)
2 + x1,1 + x1,2 min
x2∈R2
(x2,2)
2 − x2,1x2,2
s.t. ‖x1‖2 + ‖x2‖2 ≤ 1, s.t. ‖x1‖2 + ‖x2‖2 ≤ 1,
x1,1 ≥ 0, x1,2 ≤ 0.5, x2,1 ≤ 0, 0.3 ≤ x2,2 ≤ 0.8.
This is a GPG [20]. We run Algorithm 3.1 with
x
(0)
1 = (0.5, 0.5), x
(0)
2 = (−0.6, 0.6), τ (0) = 0.1,
and τ (k+1) updated as (4.3). For k = 16, we get x(16) = (0,−0.5, 0, 0.3) as a GNE
with accuracy parameter ε = 4.1908 · 10−10. It costs around 4.11 seconds.
Example 5.6. Consider the 3-player GNEP whose optimization problems are
min
x1∈R1
(x1 − x2)2 min
x2∈R1
(x2 − x3)2 min
x3∈R1
(x3 − x1)2
s.t.
∑3
i=1(xi)
2 ≤ 10 s.t. x2 ≤ 3 s.t.
∑3
i=1 xi ≤ 6.
Any feasible point x with x1 = x2 = x3 is a GNE, with optimal value 0 for all
players. If we run Algorithm 3.1 with (x
(0)
1 , x
(0)
2 , x
(0)
3 ) = (0, 1, 2) and τ
(k) = 0
(which is actually not allowed since we require τ > 0, but we still show the result
of τ = 0 in order to show the necessity of a positive τ), then we get an alternating
sequence
(0, 1, 2) −→ (1, 1, 2) −→ (1, 2, 2) −→ (1, 2, 1) −→ (2, 2, 1)
−→ (2, 1, 1) −→ (2, 1, 2) −→ (1, 1, 2) −→ · · · .
If we run Algorithm 3.1 with the same initial point x(0) = (0, 1, 2) but different
regularization parameter τ (k), the computational results are reported in Table 1.
We run it for five different τ (k). Two of them are fixed values 0.1, 0.05, and the
other one is τ0 = 0.5, τ
(k+1) updated as (4.3). In the table, “Iteration Difference”
is the value of
max
291≤i<j≤300
‖x(i) − x(j)‖∞
since none of these five sequence satisfies (5.1) at the 300 iteration. And “error”
means the number that x(300) can be verified up to as a GNE.
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Table 1. Computational Results for Example 5.6
τ (k+1) x1 x2 x3 Iteration Difference ε
0.1000 1.4289 1.4289 1.4289 1.9139 · 10−5 10−7
0.0500 1.4494 1.4494 1.4494 5.2015 · 10−5 10−7
(4.3) 1.4116 1.4106 1.4116 0.0020 10−6
Example 5.7. Consider the following 2-player GNEP
min
x1∈R2
(x1,1)
3 + x1,2x2,1 + x1,1x1,2 + x2,2 min
x2∈R2
−(x2,1)4 + x1,1(x2,2)2
s.t. (x1,1)
2 + (x1,2)
2 ≤ 1 s.t. x1,1 ≤ (x2,1)2 + (x2,2)2 ≤ 1.
It can be observed that both objective functions are nonconvex. Further the feasible
set of the second player is not convex neither. We run Algorithm 3.1 with x(0) =
(0.5, 0.5, 0.6, 0.6) and fixed τ (k) = 0.02. For k = 16, we get
x(16) = (−0.9342, −0.3568, 1.0000, −3.7839 · 10−5),
which is a GNE. The accuracy ε = 6.1075 · 10−8. It costs around 3.68 seconds.
Example 5.8. ( [16, 30]) Consider the example of a model for Internet switching
[16, 30]. Assume there are N users, and the maximum capacity of the buffer is B.
The xi denotes the amount of ith user’s “packets” in the buffer. It is clear xi ≥ 0
for any i. We also suggest the buffer is managed with “drop-tail” policy, which
means if the buffer is full, further packets will be lost and resent. Let xi
x1+···+xN
be
the transmission rate of user i, and x1+···+xN
B
represent the congestion level of the
buffer, and 1− x1+···+xN
B
measure the decrease in the utility of the ith user as the
congestion level increases. The ith user’s optimization problem is{
min
xi
fi(x) = − xix1+···+xN (1− x1+···+xNB )
s.t. xi ≥ 0, x1 + · · ·xN ≤ B.
It can be transformed into a polynomial optimization problem by introducing a
new variable yi for each player. The GNEP is then equivalent to that

min
xi,yi
−xiyi(1−
∑
xi
B
)
s.t. xi ≥ 0, x1 + · · ·xN ≤ B
(x1 + · · ·+ xN )yi = 1.
Here, we consider the case that B = 1 and N = 10, and run Algorithm 3.1 with
the initial point
(0.4, 0.01, 0.01, . . . , 0.01︸ ︷︷ ︸
9 times
, 1/0.49, 1/0.49, . . . , 1/0.49︸ ︷︷ ︸
10 times
),
and τ (0) = 0.1. The parameters τ (k) are updated as in (4.3). After 47 iterations,
Algorithm 3.1 returned the point (here we only show the result of x1, . . . , x10)
(0.09, 0.09, . . . , 0.09).
with accuracy parameter ε = 1.6344 · 10−8. It costs around 61.93 seconds.
Example 5.9. ( [19, A. 1]) Consider a variation of the GNEP in the last example
that we change the constraints of the first player to 0.3 ≤ xi ≤ 0.5. This GNEP
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can also be transformed into a GNEPP by introducing a new variable yi for each
player and it is then equivalent to that
player i = 1 player i > 1
min
x1,y1∈R
−x1y1(1−
∑
x1
B
) min
xi,yi∈R
−xiyi(1−
∑
xi
B
)
s.t. 0.3 ≤ x1 ≤ 0.5 s.t. x1 + · · ·+ xN ≤ B, xi ≥ 0.001
(x1 + · · ·+ xN )y1 = 1 (x1 + · · ·+ xN )yi = 1.
Here, we consider the case that B = 1 and N = 10, the same as in [19]. We run
Algorithm 3.1 with the initial point
(0.3, 0.01, 0.01, . . . , 0.01︸ ︷︷ ︸
9 times
, 1/0.39, 1/0.39, . . . , 1/0.39︸ ︷︷ ︸
10 times
)
and τ (0) = 0.1. The parameters τ (k) are updated as in (4.3). After 47 iterations,
Algorithm 3.1 returned the point (here we only show the result of x1, . . . , x10)
(0.3, 0.06943, 0.06943, . . . , 0.06943)
with accuracy parameter ε = 1.1261 · 10−8. It costs around 60.69 seconds.
Example 5.10. Consider the GNEP which is the same as in Example 5.9 except
we change the objective function to
fi(x) =
xi
x1 + · · ·+ xN (1−
x1 + · · ·+ xN
B
).
We still consider the case that B = 1 and N = 10, and the same technique to
transform each player’s subproblem into polynomial optimization problems. Start
from the initial point
(0.3, 0.01, 0.01, . . . , 0.01︸ ︷︷ ︸
9 times
, 1/0.39, 1/0.39, . . . , 1/0.39︸ ︷︷ ︸
10 times
)
with τ (0) = 0.1 and τ (k) updated as in (4.3). After 44 iterations, Algorithm 3.1
returns the GNE (here we only show the result of x1, . . . , x10)
(0.5000, 0.4920, 0.0010, . . . , 0.0010)
with the accuracy parameter ǫ = 3.7773 · 10−7. It took about 59 seconds.
Example 5.11. (Random GNEPPs with joint simplex/ball constraints) We ran-
domly generate objective polynomials for each player with the joint simplex/ball
constraint
N∑
i=1
ni∑
j=1
xi,j = 1, xi,j ≥ 0, or ‖x1‖2 + · · ·+ ‖xN‖2 ≤ 1.
We generate 100 random instances and count the number of problems that was
solved successfully by Algorithm 3.1. The accuracy parameter is set to be ε = 10−6
for checking x(k) as a GNE, i.e., we regard (x(k)) as a GNE if (5.2) was satisfied
with ε = 10−6. For each instance, we run Algorithm 3.1 for at most 200 loops
with τ (0) = 0.1, τ (k+1) updated as in (4.3). If it does not return a GNE with
required accuracy, we regard that it fails to solve the GNEP. The performance of
Algorithm 3.1 is reported in Table 2. The number N is the number of players, ni
is the dimension of the ith player’s strategy vector, and d is the degree of objective
polynomials. The time is measured in seconds.
THE GAUSS-SEIDEL METHOD FOR GNEPPS 21
Table 2. Computational Results for Example 5.11
Joint Simplex Joint Ball
N (n1, . . . , nN ) d Succ. Rate Ave. Time Succ. Rate Ave. Time
3 (2,2,2) 3 100% 9.97 94 % 16.71
3 (2,2,2) 4 92% 46.10 83 % 37.88
3 (3,3,3) 2 95% 11.21 97 % 9.93
3 (3,3,3) 3 92% 36.21 96 % 38.44
3 (3,3,3) 4 84% 98.76 88 % 88.98
4 (3,3,3,3) 2 94% 19.50 96 % 19.10
2 (4,3) 3 97% 13.53 92 % 17.55
2 (4,3) 4 92% 52.54 94 % 55.65
3 (3,2,4) 2 96% 9.43 97 % 9.09
3 (3,2,4) 3 92% 44.53 98 % 26.06
4 (3,2,4,2) 2 93% 19.52 95 % 22.73
4 (3,2,4,2) 3 94% 70.76 96 % 89.46
5.1 Test problems in [19]
We apply Algorithm 3.1 to solve the GNEPs in [19] that are GNEPPs or that
can be transformed into GNEPPs. We normalize the objective functions such that
the greatest absolute values of the coefficients are equal to one. For example, the
problem A.17 in [19] is normalized as follows:
min
x1∈R2
1
38 ((x1,1)
2 + x1,1x1,2 + (x1,2)
2) min
x2∈R1
1
25 (x1,1 + x1,2)x2,1
+(x1,1 + x1,2)x2,1 − 25x1,138 − x1,2 + 125 (x2,1)2 − x2,1
s.t. x1,1 + 2x1,2 − x2,1 ≤ 14, s.t. x1,1 + 2x1,2 − x2,1 ≤ 14,
3x1,1 + 2x1,2 + x2,1 ≤ 30, 3x1,1 + 2x1,2 + x2,1 ≤ 30,
x1 ≥ 0, x1 ≥ 0.
For the test problem A.2 and A.14, we use the same technique as shown in Ex-
ample 5.9 to transform these non-polynomial GNEPs into GNEPPs. For the test
problem A.10a, we run Algorithm 3.1 with the same initial point as in [19] and
yield an alternative sequence that is not convergent. Moreover, we also run Al-
gorithm 3.1 with randomly generated feasible initial points for 100 times and no
convergent sequence can be obtained. All the parameters are settled the same as
in [19] for each problem. The computational results are shown in Table 3, where e
denotes the vector of all ones. All the problems, except problem A.10a, were solved
successfully by Algorithm 3.1.
6. Conclusions
This paper discusses how to use the Gauss-Seidel method for solving the gen-
eralized Nash equilibrium problems of polynomials. The polynomial optimization
in each loop of the Gauss-Seidel method is solved by the Lasserre type Moment-
SOS relaxations. The convergence results are presented for general GNEPs and for
the special case of GPGs. In particular, we give a certificate for checking GPGs.
Numerical experiments show that the Gauss-Seidel method is efficient for solving
many GNEPPs, even if the players’ optimization problems are nonconvex.
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Table 3. Computational Results for test problems in [19]
problem initial point τ0 τ
(k+1) iterations time ε
A.2 0.05e 0.1 (4.3) 27 37.61 0.73 · 10−7
A.3 0.1e 0.1 (4.3) 46 13.13 0.10 · 10−5
A.4 0.1e 0.1 (4.3) 12 10.96 0.32 · 10−6
A.5 0.1e 0.1 (4.3) 25 10.21 0.16 · 10−7
A.6 e 0.1 (4.3) 38 11.38 0.41 · 10−6
A.7 e 0.1 (4.3) 17 10.74 0.21 · 10−7
A.8 0.5e 0.1 (4.3) 54 14.84 0.52 · 10−6
A.10a see [19] 0.1 (4.3) 200 not convergent
A.11 0.5e 0.1 (4.3) 37 4.86 0.11 · 10−6
A.12 e 0.1 (4.3) 65 7.22 0.17 · 10−7
A.13 e 0.1 (4.3) 12 2.01 0.71 · 10−8
A.14 0.1e 0.1 (4.3) 42 50.50 0.56 · 10−8
A.15 e 0.0001 (4.3) 200 45.51 0.13 · 10−5
A.17 e 0.001 (4.3) 200 25.82 0.19 · 10−7
A.18 e 0.5 (4.3) 200 59.11 0.29 · 10−5
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